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ABSTRACT 
 
 How is the natural environment used and understood in contemporary Bolivian 
politics? To answer this question, this thesis examines two environmental conflicts, one 
past and one contemporary. In 2011, indigenous communities from the Indigenous 
Territory and Isiboro Secure National Park participated in the Eighth March for Territory 
and Dignity to protest the Villa Tunari–San Ignacio de Moxos Highway planned for 
construction through the TIPNIS. Using the existing literature, I show how this protest 
utilized distinct forms of environmentalism to combat state resource claims. My 
contribution to the field is the exposition of how the environment is used and understood 
surrounding the indigenous resistance to the Chepete-Bala dam. I have found that, much 
like the TIPNIS conflict, the indigenous peoples from Madidi national park and the Pilón 
Lajas reserve utilize their indigenous identity to craft a distinct place-based 
environmentalism to combat government claims to their territory. Additionally, through 
careful examination of the Coordinadora Para La Defensa De La Amazonia’s actions and 
statements, I uncover the nuanced politics that non-governmental organizations must 
navigate in order to express any type of environmentalism in Bolivia. I argue that these 
development projects cannot be fully understood without attention to the ways in which 
both state, indigenous, and other non-governmental actors use and construct their 
understanding of the environment. This original research serves to add to the existing 
literature on socioenvironmental conflicts in Bolivia, and in light of global climate 
change, it hopes to more broadly inform socioenvironmental policy-making by 
impressing the importance that social factors have on the natural world.  
  
iv	
	
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Title Page i 
Copyright Page  ii 
Abstract iii 
Table of Contents iv 
Table of Figures v 
 
CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION 1 
 
1.1 Context 1 
1.2 Research Question & Hypothesis 5 
1.2 Methodology 7 
1.4 Thesis Overview 12 
 
CHAPTER 2 – LITERATURE REVIEW 14 
 
2.1 Introduction 14 
2.2 Constructs of Nature & Environmentalism 14 
2.3 Protected Areas & Sustainable Development 16 
2.4 Indigeneity 22 
2.5 Constraints of Social Activism in Bolivia 25 
2.6 Contribution 29 
 
CHAPTER 3 – THE ISIBORO SECURE INDIGENOUS TERRITORY AND 
NATIONAL PARK (TIPNIS)               30 
 
3.1 Introduction 30 
3.2 Government Speech & Actions 33 
3.3 Anti-road Response 35 
3.4 Analysis 37 
 
CHAPTER 4 – THE CHEPETE-BALA DAM 40 
 
3.1 Introduction 40 
3.2 Government Speech & Actions 43 
3.3 Anti-dam Response 44 
3.4 Coordinadora Para La Defensa De La Amazonia 46 
3.5 Analysis 51 
 
CHAPTER 5 – CONCLUSION 53 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 56 
  
v	
	
TABLE OF FIGURES 
 
Table 1 Sentiments, Actions, Justifications of Actors: A cursory overview 5 
Figure 1 Protected Areas of National Interest 18 
Figure 2 Route of the Proposed Road through the TIPNIS 32 
  
1	
	
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Context 
Globally, environmental discourse and concern have never been more important. 
The Earth’s climate is growing hotter each year, and with this comes a plethora of 
subsequent issues: sea waters are rising and becoming more tumultuous, rain is falling 
too much or too little, and food will become more difficult to grow by conventional 
methods. This climate change is exceptionally visible in Bolivia. One lake, Lago Popoó 
has almost entirely vanished, and another is evaporating away as well. Glaciers are 
rapidly disappearing, with almost a third already gone in 2011 (Glennie, 2011). This is 
because the Andean highlands in particular are growing more arid - less rain is falling to 
refill its already low water resources (Escurra, Vazquez, Cestti, De Nys, & Srinivasan, 
2014).  
In light of the climate issues facing the country and the world, President Morales 
champions notions of sustainability and environmentalism, valorizing Bolivia’s unique 
indigenous connection to Mother Earth in the process. In October 2015 before the 
Climate Summit in Paris, Bolivia hosted the People’s Climate Change conference in 
Cochabamba. This prelude to the global conference was to represent “unheard” voices of 
the United Nations climate summit (Al Jazeera, 2015). They put together a ten-point plan 
to combat climate change, with solutions ranging from diverting military spending to 
climate change initiatives, the creation of an international climate court to hold countries 
accountable for their carbon emissions, and eliminating technology patents to allow the 
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sharing of new energy technologies (Shankleman, 2015). The plan, in classic Morales 
fashion, linked capitalism to the destruction of Mother Earth.  
As a champion of the environment and marginalized indigenous Bolivians, the 
Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) government drafted and passed a new constitution in 
2009. Multiple clauses immensely augmented the rights given to indigenous communities 
throughout the country. The most important of these new statues for environmental 
movements has been Articles 2 and 30, which guaranteed the respect for indigenous 
autonomies and ensured consultation before extractive projects began on lands where 
indigenous peoples lived. Despite their own constitution and Morales’s rhetoric on 
protecting Mother Earth, the MAS government has ignored these clauses in pursuit of 
environmentally degrative development projects. This thesis examines two of these 
instances: the Villa Tunari–San Ignacio de Moxos Highway planned for the Territorio 
Indígena y Parque Nacional Isiboro-Secure (Indigenous Territory and Isiboro Secure 
National Park, TIPNIS) and the Chepete-Bala dam on the Beni River. Both projects 
generated nation-wide opposition, and both incited indigenous-led environmental 
resistance. The government supported neither of the movements, instead attempting to 
delegitimize them, and, in the case of the TIPNIS ‘massacre,’ violently repressed it. Why 
would a pro-indigenous government (and proudly indigenous president) ignore one of its 
greatest campaign promises and marginalize indigenous environmental movements? 
What does this say about Bolivian indigeneity and its links to the environment? These 
questions are part of Bolivia’s environmental narrative, and answering them will help to 
show the environment is used and constructed in Bolivian politics. 
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The TIPNIS is located in the Beni, a department in eastern Bolivia bordering 
Cochabamba. In 1996, it was declared an Original Community Territory, which under the 
1994 Constitution legally barred the migration of farmers to the region. It recognized the 
indigenous peoples living in the park and allowed for two economic models of 
development to co-exist, permitting the area’s indigenous to continue living as they had 
and labeling a distinct area as one which the migrants could move to. This created what 
came to be called the 7th Polygon, where the majority of migrants were Andean coca 
growers (Fernández, 2012). In 2011, the government incited the passions of the same 
population when it proposed building a highway through the heart of the TIPNIS. It 
claimed that the road would bring economic development and better access to healthcare 
for the region, despite its location being far from most of the communities it claimed to 
help. The indigenous populations of the park felt that the government had violated its 
constitution as it did not give them the required “prior consultation” before seeking to 
initiate the project. In response, they organized the Eighth March for life, dignity, and 
territory, marching from the TIPNIS to La Paz. On the 25th of September, the march was 
violently halted by national military. Undeterred, they continued and arrived to cheering 
crowds in La Paz and gained concessions from the government. 
The march, at core, was founded on a type of environmentalism. The indigenous 
tribes of the TIPNIS were marching to protect their way of life, which necessarily 
involved their link to the TIPNIS environment. They are river people, meaning they use 
the rivers for transportation and food. Any large alteration to their territory would be an 
attack upon their culture, livelihood, and homes. This, at least, is the environmental 
narrative utilized by the marchers. Much research has been conducted on the 
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environmental tensions surrounding the project, and those articles are discussed later in 
study. They highlight the distinct social and cultural expressions that environmentalism 
assumes in Bolivia, revealing the tensions between development, indigeneity, and 
environmentalism which creates a distinctly Bolivian, socioenvironmental narrative. 
The Chepete-Bala project is a planned series of two dams on the Beni River, 
which runs between the Madidi National Park and the Pilón Lajas reserve. These dams 
would flood one of the most biodiverse areas on the planet, though the concerns 
surrounding the project include more local ones in addition to the scientific concern for 
biodiversity. As with the TIPNIS case, the government did not consult the indigenous 
populations living in the area for approval of the project, instead selectively choosing 
correspondents from the communities who the government already knew supported the 
project (Coordinadora Para la Defensa de la Amazonia, 2017). It also refused to release 
its ecological and economic impact surveys, which it also conducted without the consent 
of the area’s inhabitants. Many communities would be affected by the flooding or 
rerouting of water, and some would have to relocate. As with the TIPNIS march, the 
indigenous protest asked the government to consult them about the project, seeking to 
express why they opposed the dam. In response, the government said that “small groups” 
were influencing the communities, implying that the indigenous peoples of Madidi and 
Pilón Lajas do not know what is best for them. The conflict generated by the planned 
Chepete-Bala dams, much like the TIPNIS road, has exposed nuanced tensions between 
indigenous identity, the government’s ecologically-destructive development model, and 
Bolivian environmentalism.  
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Table	1:	Sentiments,	Actions,	Justifications	of	Actors:	A	cursory	overview	
Government NGOs, Organizations Grassroots – Individual 
Sentiments 
Is very wary of NGOs due 
to their historical 
representation of foreign 
influence. 
Have historically provided 
developmental aid in 
absence of state 
Some feel abandoned by the 
government (rural antiplano 
visit) 
Military control of water 
during drought (Water 
Scaracity Crisis in 
November 2016) 
Skepticism of Government 
censorship 
Feel government is corrupt 
(host family, Requena, 
Arguedas) 
Police control of protesters 
(TIPNIS) 
The Fundación Amigos de 
la Naturaleza (FAN) 
contributes to conservation, 
but not to social activism. 
Lowland indigenous 
cultures are marginalized 
by state patrimony. 
“Vivir Bien” rhetoric, 
which claims to respect the 
rights of Mother Earth and 
indigenous peoples 
Fundación Solón: 
Multipurpose NGO, 
opposed the Chepete-Bala 
dam. 
Ties environment to 
indigeneity to legitimize 
territory claims. 
Extraction-led development  Suyana and Programa de 
Fortalicimiento Integral: 
development NGOs. 
Uninvolved in social 
activism. 
Eighth March: TIPNIS 
protest. Demanded that the 
state recognize their 
territorial rights. 
Claims to represent all 
indigenous peoples, and its 
2009 Constitution respects 
indigenous rights 
 Chepete-Bala: 12-day vigil. 
Cited Article 30 of 
constitution. 
 
Research Question & Hypothesis 
In the global context of climate change and environmental concern, Bolivia is in a 
unique position. As a developing country, it could follow the usual trend and 
development via extraction and export of natural resources, or it could become a model 
of sustainable development for the region. Various actors can influence which direction 
the country will take due to the distinct place environmental discourse has in Bolivian 
6	
	
politics. Acknowledging this fact, this thesis seeks to answer the following question: How 
is the environment used and discussed in Bolivian politics? 
To answer this question, I examine the political discourse surrounding two 
environmentally-destructive ‘megaprojects’ proposed by the government: the Villa 
Tunari–San Ignacio de Moxos Highway and the Chepete-Bala hydroelectric dam. Both 
projects would significantly alter the landscape and ecological systems of their 
perspective protected areas, making the environment an integral part of the political 
discussion and protest. The political discourse and response surrounding these projects 
involves the themes of environmentalism, indigeneity, social movements, and 
developmental economics, all of which will be generally explored in the Chapter 2 of this 
thesis and later expounded upon in the case studies of Chapters 3 and 4. 
By the facts revealed in examination of these cases, I argue that, while the 
environment is touted as an important part of the country’s culture, it is often used as an 
agent of political positioning and posture. The state of the environment is not, in and of 
itself, the reason for its importance on the political scene. Instead, environmental claims 
are often more local or economically founded, and utilizing an actor’s relationship to 
nature is more effective than a concern-for-nature type of environmentalism. This is not 
to say that the actors do not have larger beliefs about the environment, but that, for 
politics, the discussion of the environment is a tool used by both sides to position 
themselves as the more legitimate actor.  
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Methodology 
In order to answer this question, I first had to arrive at the question. Based on my 
observations from Bolivia and my personal interests, I became interested in Bolivian 
environmental movements and organizations. Specifically, I sought to examine recent 
protests within Bolivia and connect them to a potentially distinct form of 
environmentalism. This thesis is qualitative in nature, and so I decided to approach the 
topic of environmentalism in Bolivia generally as to allow for the data I collected to 
speak for itself. To achieve this end, I performed semi-structured interviews in Spanish 
with two key informants: Ursula Arguedas and Cecilia Requena. Ursula Arguedas is an 
admin of the Facebook Page “No a la Represa de El Bala” (No to the Bala Dam), and 
Cecilia Requena is an increasingly referenced political analyst and environmental activist 
in the country. These interviews served to refine my question while providing me with 
background information and perspectives unavailable through regular media outlets.  
In addition to these interviews, I utilized the Coordinadora Para La Defensa De La 
Amazonia’s (Coordinator for the Defense of the Amazon, CODA) exposition of personal 
testimonies from the San Miguel del Bala population that will be affected by the Chepete-
Bala dam. These are a series of 20 interviews, each ranging from one to four minutes 
long, and I use them as a primary source, taking into account not only how the speakers 
are portrayed, but also what that portrayal means in the broader political context. I use a 
number of Bolivian and foreign news sources to elaborate on the political context and 
positioning of the two cases. Finally, much of my fieldwork took place on Facebook, as it 
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served to connect me to the marginalized voices of the affected peoples. All of these 
interviews and sources were in Spanish. 
While a structured interview follows a well-defined order of questions, the semi-
structured style allows for the interviewee to speak more freely. It was accepted and in 
many ways ideal if one question lead them to speak on other areas. This branching would 
reveal connections between words and topics. Usually, the interviewer can anticipate the 
areas and issues the interviewee might bring up during the conversation, and they can 
then find that area in their list of prewritten questions and follow-up questions. 
Specifically, I prepared a document of questions and follow-up questions. They were 
sorted thematically and were written in both English and Spanish. The themes included: 
• Inter-indigenous hierarchies 
• Bolivia with outsiders 
• Nature 
• Conservation movements/NGOs 
• Vivir Bien 
• Politics 
• Coca 
• Water 
• The Amazon 
• Indigeneity 
• TIPNIS 
• International Rhetoric 
• Environmental Education 
• Land 
• “the process of socialization” 
 
This type of interview structure allowed me to follow the interviewee’s 
conversation thematically, enabling me to draw out more detailed answers or to make the 
interviewee restate their answer in different words. Because I was considering ontologies 
of nature and how they justified their claims about the environment, word choice and 
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presentation of an issue were extremely important. I spent time carefully crafting my 
questions as to elicit responses that would indicate the interviewee’s beliefs and 
ontologies. To achieve this, I kept my questions simple, asking generally about a theme 
or topic to allow for as broad or as minimal a response as the interviewee wished to 
supply. Additionally, I remained vigilantly aware of the demographic I spoke with. The 
interviews with Arguedas and Requena showed me the language used by environmentally 
conscious, middle to high class Bolivians. This class distinction is extremely important 
when considering justification and ontology, as their concerns will not be congruent with 
an impoverished Bolivian’s nor a government official’s. 
I decided not to limit my medium of communication to any one form, as both 
written and verbal communication have their pros and cons. Interviews over email allow 
the respondent to carefully and mindfully craft their answers. In theory, the answers they 
give are exactly what they want to say. This is how I spoke to Ursula Arguedas, one of 
the three creators of various Facebook pages dedicated to the dissemination of anti-
Chepete-Bala information. What is lost through this medium is the immediacy of the 
verbal response and any physical reactions of the respondent. Just as email allows for 
more thoughtful response with exact language, verbal interviews force the respondent to 
immediately answer the question, giving less time for thought. Theoretically, this 
approach can generate more truthful or less careful responses as the respondent does not 
have much time to carefully select their words. This is how I spoke with Cecilia Requena, 
an educated political activist and environmental investigator. These were the only two 
interviews I successful scheduled and conducted myself. Both were conducted in 
Spanish. 
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Cecilia Requena is a self-described rational ecologist and social activist. For my 
investigation, I used her as a key informant due to her credentials. She has a Master’s in 
Buisness and Public Policy, with a Postgraduate degree in Socioenvironmental Education 
from the Latin American Studies department of the National University of La Plata in 
Argentina (Post Grado en Formación Socioambiental de la Facultad Latinoamericana de 
La Plata). She has become an increasingly prominent environmental investigator in 
Bolivia and co-authored Bolivia en un mundo 4 grados más caliente: Escenarios 
sociopolíticos ante el cambio climático para los años 2030 y 2060 en el altiplano norte 
(Bolivia in a 4-degree hotter world: Sociopolitical scenarios of climate change in 2030 
and 2060 in the northern plateau). Her study, sponsored by the Programa de Investigación 
Estratégica en Bolivia (Strategic Investigation Program in Bolivia, PIEB), examined the 
plausible environment scenarios Bolivia will encounter in the years 2030 and 2060 if the 
current CO2 emission rates do not decrease. She has been interviewed on Bolivian radio 
stations and news outlets about the state of Bolivia’s socioenvironmental development, 
using a global perspective to critique the government’s developmental megaprojects. 
Given her experience and qualifications, I give her words due weight, using them to help 
frame the general discussion around these megaprojects. During our interview, I asked 
her to elaborate on the following themes: 
• Who she is, what she does. 
• The state of Bolivian conservation movements 
o Why no one wants to be a visible leader of these movements 
• The cultural difference between La Paz and Santa Cruz as regards the 
environment and social movements. 
• The Chepete-Bala hydroelectric dam 
• The TIPNIS Eighth March 
• Use of Social Media to organize social movements 
11	
	
• The challenges of environmentalists working in a developing country 
(specifically Bolivia) 
• Water Scarcity 
• Vivir Bien 
In addition to interviews, I used government published documents, the current 
Bolivian Constitution, Bolivian newspapers, and speeches given by Evo Morales as 
primary sources. El Cambio is the government published newspaper, and it casts all 
issues in favor of the government’s actions. It was a particularly useful source for the 
Chepete-Bala project. I used articles from Página Siete and La Razón as secondary 
sources. They gave me the context and reality of current events. All articles from 
Bolivian new sources were in Spanish. 
Facebook pages served me as primary sources. While these pages are not usually 
socioeconomically diverse in their followings, they offer a direct window into social 
organization around a given issue. Additionally, they are used as a platform for the 
dissemination of marginalized viewpoints. One of the pages that provided me with the 
most data was the Coordinadora Para La Defensa de la Amazonia’s Facebook page. On 
it, they disperse news and documents pertaining to the Chepete-Bala project, including 
interviews they conducted with inhabitants from San Miguel del Bala, the area where the 
Bala dam will be built. Careful examination of the interviewee’s testimonies and 
portrayal revealed the linguistic politicking and positioning that surrounds this project. I 
perused multiple explicitly anti-Chepte-Bala pages as well, examining the type of news 
and information spread and the reactions to these posts. While these social media sites are 
available to many, a particular demographic dominates the discussion on these pages. 
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This demographic is not the focus of this thesis, and instead I simply recognize this 
dimension as a factor that likely influences the rhetoric utilized by the actors. 
My time and experience in Bolivia during July and August 2016 serves me as a 
primary source. Much of what I saw and heard shapes the narrative of these 
environmental issues. I spoke with the field engineers that worked for Suyana, a Swiss 
developmental NGO working in the Bolivian highlands. This interview exposed the 
profundity of water scarcity in the highlands and contextualized its impacts on both 
people and land. Travelling with them into the plateau above La Paz put me in contact 
with extremely impoverished populations, and the campesino voice is an important 
contribution to the national Bolivian environmental narrative. With my classmates, I 
spoke with Robert Brockmann, a National Information Officer of the Bolivian United 
Nations Development office, and on a different day we visited Hugo Borrea, the creator 
of Programa de Fortalicimiento Integral whose current project deals in climate mitigation 
on the plateau. Both occasions served to elaborate on the countries environmental issues 
in the context of development. The conversations I had with my host family and friends 
likewise served to spur the development of this thesis topic. While none of these 
conversations are cited directly in this thesis, they served me by providing the context by 
which I investigated my question. 
 
Thesis Overview 
This thesis is organized as follows. The first chapter introduces the events and 
themes involved in this thesis. Chapter two is my literature review in which I explore the 
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themes of environmentalism, challenges to development, indigeneity, and Bolivian social 
movements as pertains to environmental politics. Chapter three discusses the events and 
rhetoric surrounding the TIPNIS conflict, with subsections examining government 
actions and resistance to the government actions and politics. Chapter four examines the 
conflicts over the Chepete-Bala dam in detail with subsections on government actions, 
indigenous resistance, and the efforts of the CODA. Chapter five concludes my thesis, 
discussing any difficulties encountered during the study while providing suggestions for 
future research. 
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Chapter 2 
Dam Politics: Bolivian Indigeneity, Rhetoric, and Envirosocial Movements in a 
Developing State 
 
Introduction 
To understand how the environment is used in political rhetoric and positioning, it is 
necessary to first establish the ontologies of the environment in Bolivia. This literature 
review will elaborate on several key themes that pertain to Bolivian environmentalism. 
First, I give a theoretical discussion of the types of environmentalism to provide 
perspective on the distinct Bolivian forms of it. I follow this with a brief history of the 
Bolivian system of protected areas and National Parks. This leads into a short discussion 
on the general challenges developing countries face when trying to balance the 
environment and development. Next, I discuss the concept of indigeneity, focusing on its 
link to the Bolivian environment and politics. This leads to a small section that discusses 
Bolivian social movements, as pertains to the environment. Together, these themes reveal 
the importance of environmental claims in Bolivian politics. 
 
Constructs of Nature & Environmentalism 
Ellen’s understanding of “nature” is useful in the Bolivian context. He argues that, 
“How people conceptualize nature depends on how they use it, how they transform it, and 
how, in so doing, they invest knowledge in different parts of it” (Ellen, 2008). 
Essentially, nature is not a fixed, solid construct. It is classified and distinguished based 
on people’s interaction with their habitat and ecosystem, meaning nature’s definition will 
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vary based on people’s perspective (Croll & Parkin, 2002). If nature is a fluid construct, 
then it can be manipulated in conversations of control and power. As Croll and Parkin 
surmise, “Control and therefore power is thus central to discussions of the environment 
and its relations to culture and human endeavor.” 
As a starting point, environmentalism can be loosely defined as “the ethical and 
political perspective that places the health, harmony, and integrity of the natural 
environment at the center of human attention and concern” (Ball, 2011). Beneath this 
definition exist many subdivisions and types of environmentalism. A few are important in 
the Bolivian context, and their exposition will help elucidate how the environment is 
utilized as a political tool. Hope breaks this larger construct of environmentalism down, 
considering it a dynamic construct that possesses ecological, ontological, and political 
connotations. Recognition of these “interlinked dimensions of environmentalism” serves 
to more completely reveal environmentalism’s narrative in Bolivia (Hope, 2016). A first 
dimension is concern over the varied impacts humanity makes on the planet. Second is a 
recognition of an anti-essentialist view of nature, meaning that nature is perceived and 
valued differently per group. A third and final recognition is that these issues are political 
by necessity and are frequently tied to themes of social justice. Understanding the 
interplay between these types of environmentalism and constructions of nature is 
necessary for examination of environmental politics. 
It is important not to essentialize indigeneity and environmentalism, though 
indigenous peoples are able to claim exclusive environmentalisms. As Cohen argues in 
his exposition on cultural identity, only indigenous peoples can truly claim to be tied to 
the ancestral lands where their “symbolic resources,” such as sacred places or animals 
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necessary for the practice of culturally important hunting skills, exist (Cohen, 1993). This 
is how harming “nature” is often equated to harming indigenous peoples, as the 
destruction of their home is the destruction of their culture as well. Hope termed this 
“place-based environmentalism,” referring to a people’s care for the land based on its 
cultural significance to them (Hope, 2016). When any type of environmentalism is 
employed as a means of political movement by marginalized populations, it could be 
called “environmentalism-from-below,” which is how Hope described the Octava Marcha 
(Eighth March) from the TIPNIS. 
 
Protected Areas & Sustainable Development 
A recent, pertinent history of Bolivian Protected Areas and the institution in 
charge of monitoring their economic and environmental integrity, the Servicio Nacional 
de Áreas Protegidas  (National Service of Protected Areas, SERNAP), will help to 
elucidate part of Bolivia’s environmental political structure. The first protected area was 
the Sajama National Park, created in 1939 with the objective of protecting its queñua 
forests (Programa de Investigación Estratégica en Bolivia, 2012). Later, in the 60s, the 
TIPNIS was founded. In 1974, the first government institution was created to monitor the 
use and development of APs, but did not act with consideration for biodiversity or 
indigenous inhabitants as the SERNAP does now. It was not until the first Indigenous 
March for Territory and Dignity in 1990, led by communities from the Beni whose land 
was threatened by logging companies, that a PA became legally recognized as an 
indigenous territory. This spurred the development of the National System of Protected 
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Areas (SNAP) in 1992, whose purpose was to contribute to the processes of conservation, 
the maintenance of biodiversity, and the sustainable use of natural resources. 
The SNAP is of 123 legally established APs. This represents some 20% of 
Bolivia’s geographic space. The SERNAP is in charge of 22 APs, which together 
represent 76% of the SNAP’s combined land mass and 15.5% of Bolivia. For 
comparison, just under 13% of the United States is protected land, and Costa Rica hosts 
27.6% of terrestrial land protection (United Nations Environment Programme's World 
Conservation Monitoring Centre, 2017). The same organization states that Bolivia has a 
30.87% coverage of protected land. Regardless of which statistics are more accurate 
(those reported by PIEB or by the UN), both indicate the country’s large percentage of 
land covered by protected areas. Figure 1 shows these protected areas as of 2012. 
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This attention to nature comes at an unusual time in the country’s development 
cycle. Historically, developing countries usually choose immediate economic gains and 
growth over the long-term impacts of their current market practices (Schilling & Chiang, 
2010). This is because non-renewable commodities generate substantial income, and 
these same countries must pay their debt and develop at the same time. Making the 
switch to renewable forms of energy or altering their development track to represent a 
more sustainable model is a fraught maneuver and is certainly one that does not pay off in 
the short term. This is the current challenge of Bolivia, one that has been made more 
difficult by its recent political promises and rhetoric.  
Promises to reverse the effects of neoliberalism and the statement of greater 
commitment to Bolivia’s ‘historic responsibility to Mother Earth’ (Morales, 2015) are at 
the foundation of the MAS discourse. Particularly, capitalism was positioned as a great 
evil that continues to harm the earth. Seeking an alternative to the free market 
development of capitalism while also valorizing indigenous culture, the state drafted a 
new plan under the name vivir bien (roughly translated as “living well”). This state-led 
development and environmentalism sought to “go beyond Western modernity,” meaning 
the MAS sought an alternative development that was a complete break with 
neoliberalism’s construction of developmentalism (Gudynas, 2013). This alternative 
included recognizing the rights of nature, addressing the Western ontological nature-
society divide, and finding economic growth by means other than degrative extraction. 
This search for alternatives can be filed under the complicated construction of vivir bien. 
Vivir bien means different things dependent upon the speaker, but Gudynas 
identifies four key areas of the Bolivian construction: gender, nature’s rights, 
20	
	
pluranationality, and indigenous cosmovisions. Towards this end, the MAS frequently 
invokes the name of Pachamama (Mother Earth) as it speaks out against capitalist 
actions, imaginary or real, in the state. Morales himself created his own “10 
commandments to save the planet, starting with a call to end capitalism” (PL, ABI, 
2008). In Bolivia, where capitalism is cast as an evil worthy of its own 10 
commandments, vivir bien has been positioned against the capitalist idea of “living 
better.” It serves, then, as a justification for the Bolivian pursuit of vivir bien’s model of 
development. Thus, we see how the Bolivian anti-neoliberal development model has 
essentialized vivir bien. Being anti-capitalist means being pro-Pachamama, making 
capitalism the opposite of caring for nature. 
This model of alternative development guided by vivir bien, however, became 
difficult when confronted with the reality of Bolivia’s economic situation. In the name of 
a more equitable distribution of wealth, the government nationalized resource extraction 
and deepened the existing extraction of minerals, gas, oil, and began to export new 
resources such as iron and lithium (Gudynas, 2013). Agriculture shifted towards soy and 
other monoculture for export. By 2012, Bolivia had achieved its highest levels of export 
income of over $11 billion, around 90% of which came from oil, gas, minerals, and soy. 
Thus, extractivism is deeply entrenched in the Bolivian economy, despite the dictates of 
vivir bien. The new 2009 Bolivian Constitution acquiesced to this reality. By lumped the 
rights of nature into “cultural and economic rights” and not giving nature its own, distinct 
rights, it failed to disembark from the neoliberal separation of nature and society. 
Though the plan nominally ensures the rights of Pachamama at the national level, 
Gudynas argues that the original idea was altered over time to reflect a more planetary 
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connotation. The global environment was under threat from climate change, but this did 
not carry down to local level responsibilities. At the summit on climate change convoked 
by the Morales administration in 2010 at Tiquipaya, they refused to discuss the 
environmental situation inside their country despite having extensive criticism for the 
industrialized countries. This criticism was based on the understanding of the importance 
of Pachamama within vivir bien. 
This shift from the original stance was drastic, and the government has defended 
its departure by claiming that multiple factors acted against their ability to fully realize 
vivir bien as the guiding force. Vice President García Linera published Geopolítica de la 
Amzonía, largely in response to the TIPNIS fallout, which recognized that Bolivia’s 
original “model of development” had not much changed. He blamed multiple factors. 
Bolivia is a small country, meaning it is hard to daily defend the counterrevolution, 
especially when their society is “deeply fragmented and corporate.” Additionally, this 
historically monumental revolution that seeks to change property rights and economic 
distribution had, at the time, only been in power for 6 years (Linera, 2013). 
This position justified the continuance of extraction-led development, despite its 
incongruence with the dictates of vivir bien, and it is this model of development that led 
to projects such as the TIPNIS road and the Chepete-Bala dam, both of which have 
generated social protests that have divided the government and its people, emphasizing 
its departure from the vivir bien it touts. The government’s legalistic response has been to 
redraft its laws and rhetoric to relegate vivir bien as more of an ideal guiding principal 
than a concrete law. Its framing law of October 2012 did just this. Despite speaking on 
promised areas like territory rights and environmental restoration and management, 
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Gudynas argues that it reads more like a proclamation, one that “calls for living in 
‘complementary, in harmony, and in equilibrium with Mother Earth,’” but offers no path 
for its realization (Gudynas, 2013). For Gudynas, the final departure from vivir bien was 
the law’s restoration of the idea of development. Restoring the preexisting constructs of 
development signified the acceptance of extractivism as it was now the road in the model 
of “integral development” the law selected. 
 
Indigeneity 
Li’s synthesis and formation of “positioning” and indigenous identity are useful 
as a framework for discussing the environmental politics in this thesis, as an essential part 
of the discourse around extraction and resource sovereignty in Bolivia is the use of 
indigenous identity as a positioning tool for resource claim. She finds that cultural 
identities are created around a history, but are not fixed, instead being subject to the 
interminable interplay between history, culture, and power (Li, 2008). Essentially, having 
indigenous identity is not simply a blood tie, but additionally involves history and culture 
which, together, play into politics.  
During the 1990s, Bolivia enacted several multicultural reforms that attributed a 
“rights- and resource-bearing” connotation to the identification (Weber, 2013). Later, 
Evo Morales added more layers, tying indigeneity to anti-globalization and anti-
neoliberal sentiments and emphasizing the defense of natural resources, which imperialist 
countries like the United States had taken advantage of. Being indigenous, then, has 
become a hefty consideration. As Kohl has found, indigenous identification in Bolivia is 
an increasingly fluid construct (Kohl & Farthing, 2006). Census data shows that many 
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individuals change their indigenous identification across years. While this phenomenon 
warrants further investigation, this is not the question of this project. Instead, I seek to 
elucidate the role that indigenous identity plays in environmental politics in Bolivia as a 
part of a broader survey on the state of environmentalism there, and understanding how 
indigenous identity is constructed is an important element. 
Bolivian indigenous nationalism can be generally defined as the MAS’s attempt 
to represent all Bolivian people. Its slogan is “Somos pueblo, somos MAS,” which means 
“we are the people, we are MAS” (which is also Spanish for “more”) (Postero 2010). It 
sought to appeal to all Bolivians, which it construed as poor and indigenous. It pursed 
this heterogenous indigenous identity by calling their future state “plurinational.” This 
plurinationality is defined by Gustafson as “a state that merges constitutive sovereignty 
rooted in the national people (pueblo) and indigenous plurality and self-determination” 
(Gustafson, 2009). Thus, the state claims to represent the interest of all indigeneities, and 
its tripart platform would accomplish this. One, permit and validate social movements, 
which at the time were primarily indigenous-led, and let them be the foundation of the 
MAS governance (Postero, 2010). Two, combat neoliberalism, which was cast as the 
primary cause of Bolivian suffering. Three, revive national sovereignty, which US 
imperialism had removed. This included legalizing the production of coca and assuming 
control of the country’s natural resources. In summary, the MAS attempted garner wide 
political support by claiming an indigenous nationalism, and in doing so essentialized 
indigeneity with resistance to capitalist and Western forms of development.  
Indeed, MAS’s 2009 constitution backs this platform, at least rhetorically. It 
recognizes 36 distinct national ethnic languages including Spanish, and it guarantees 
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various rights for indigenous peoples. Article 2 of the Bolivian Constitution “guarantees 
free determination under the State, including the right to autonomy, to self-governance, to 
culture, to recognition of institutions, and to the consolidation of territories, that all are 
supported by this Constitution and the law (“se garantiza su libre determinación en el 
marco de la unidad del Estado, que consiste en su derecho a la autonomía, al 
autogobierno, a su cultura, al reconocimiento de sus instituciones y a la consolidación de 
sus entidades territoriales, conforme a esta Constitución y la ley”) (Bolivia, 2009). Article 
30 details the state’s commitment to indigenous peoples. Section 2.15 states their right to 
“obligatory prior consultation enacted by the State in good faith, respecting the 
exploitation of non-renewable natural resources in inhabited territories” (“...el derecho a 
la consulta previa obligatoria, realizada por el Estado, de buena fe y concertada, respecto 
a la explotación de los recursos naturales no renovables en el territorio que habitan”). 
Additionally, point 16 states that the communities should benefit from whatever 
exploitation of natural resources that might occur in their territory. Bound by this 
guarantee of territorial sovereignty, the state must compete for legitimacy in its resource 
claims. This is where Postero’s definition of “indigenous nationalism” serves to greatly 
elucidate the complex social reality of the state’s environmentally degrative 
megaprojects, such as the TIPNIS road and the Chepete-Bala dam. It becomes a game of 
political positioning. Who is more indigenous – the state that represents all indigeneities, 
or a few indigenous communities representing themselves? Whichever actor is more 
indigenous wins the resource and territory claim. 
One important consideration for the government’s indigenous nationalism is that 
not all Bolivian indigenous cultures share the same values. While Evo Morales has done 
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a remarkable job selling his indigenous nationalism, his home and support base is 
“overwhelmingly constituted by Quechua and Aymara-speaking peasants” (Canessa, 
2006). Though the Chapare, his home, is in the lowlands, his original coca-grower union 
is filled by highland indigenous migrants to the area. This is to say, much of his espoused 
indigeneity is predominated by highland-culture, and lowland cultures are marginalized. 
Postero found that the MAS’s indigenous nationalism was “decidedly Andean” and did 
not equally value the “historically more marginalized lowland indigenous peoples” 
(Laing, 2015). While this is not the primary focus of this thesis, it is an important 
consideration. If the lowland peoples feel marginalized by Evo Morales’s preference for 
Aymaran and highland imagery and rhetoric, the MAS’s claim to represent all 
indigeneities loses some of its power. Further, as I will show in later sections, lowland 
indigenous movements can use his indigenous nationalism against the state’s claims. 
 
Constraints of Social Activism in Bolivia 
Political and social protests are a common sight in the capital city of La Paz. One 
particular protest that acquired intense media interest in July 2016 was the sit-in and 
hunger strike of disabled peoples. From all over Bolivia, several hundred disabled 
peoples made their way to Plaza Murillo in La Paz, sometimes travelling for multiple 
days, to ask the government for better working conditions and more disability benefits. 
The government responded by putting up barricades manned by its national guard. In 
August, as I was returning to Zona Sur from the airport in El Alto, my minibus had to 
take a long detour through the side streets of La Paz because a relatively small group of 
protesters (perhaps 100), were blocking the entrance to the main, central road leading 
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from El Alto into La Paz. The businessmen next to me were vocally and visibly unhappy 
about it, remarking that small protests which disrupt the daily flow should be illegal. 
Movements such as these are how Bolivians push for effective change in their 
government, and concerns for the environment are often expressed in the same way. 
While the current government is patient with and indeed facilitates social protests, 
it has shown much less willingness to allow any official non-government organization to 
facilitate any form of protest. This is because NGOs have a rocky relationship with the 
MAS government due to its history. During Bolivia’s neoliberal reforms in the late 80’s, 
NGOs became the most popular alternative to state programs to meet the needs of the 
population (Galway, Corbett, & Zeng, 2012). Thus, because many received funding from 
the World Health Organization, the World Bank, or other foreign development sources, 
NGOs came to represent foreign presence in Bolivia. Under Morales, their influence was 
inflated to represent capitalist countries tampering with the MAS’s sociopolitical 
movement. As Petras shows, Morales’s distrust is founded, as NGOs are often tied to the 
policies and donations of their country of origin (Petras, 1997).  
This is derived connotation is particularly difficult for NGOs that work with the 
environment. Because the state of the environment is a key area of MAS discourse and 
economic development, any action taken in defense of the environment against the 
government is construed as anti-Bolivian. As Morales sees it, the MAS has concern for 
the earth as a core tenant of its policy, so how could anyone else claim to oppose them 
based on concern for the environment? Additionally, much of Bolivian GDP comes from 
rents on natural resources and monoculture, both of which intensely alter their 
ecosystems. Acting on behalf of the environment against the state becomes an attack on 
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the development of the country. The result is a hardline for NGOs. Any participation in 
protests or even simple support of a protest could spell expulsion from the country.  
This is what almost happened to the Solón Foundation (Fundación Solón), an 
organization that vociferously opposes the Chepete-Bala dam project. As an organization 
dedicated to “contribute to the practice of humanity” (which includes respecting the 
rights of Mother Earth) and one that freely explores alternative development models, 
Fundación Solón is a non-governmental organization that was founded in 1994 by Walter 
Solón Romero, a Bolivian artist, to “foment the creativity and the critical view of the 
rebel spirit” and to “confront the injustices and dream of a different world” (Fundación 
Solón, 2017). Recently, Fundación Solón was in vehement verbal opposition to the 
Chepete-Bala dam megaproject, which it saw as harming both indigenous sovereignty 
and nature, which it constructs as essentially synonymous with Mother Earth. As its 
proliferation of anti-Chepte-Bala news and information were perceived as anti-
government by the MAS, Morales threatened to expunge the organization from the 
country (El País, 2016). 
While NGOs must be careful if expressing discontentment with government 
actions, they may still contribute to conservation in Bolivia. The Friends of Nature 
Foundation (FAN) is one of the largest Bolivian organizations dedicated to 
“conservation, preservation, and management” of nature. They compiled and created the 
Socioenviromental Atlas of the Bolivian Yungas and Lowlands, which is a comprehensive 
survey of the Yungas and Lowlands that details the water systems, indigenous territories, 
state of conservation, and species richness amongst other things. The FAN, while 
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certainly a leader in Bolivian conservation efforts, only contributes to the generation of 
knowledge and is inactive in the political arena (Requena, 2016).  
If an NGO does not compete with the government’s environmentalism, it is much 
freer to work with the environment. Hugo Borrea is a wealthy Bolivian lawyer who 
started his own NGO called the Programa de Fortalicimiento Integral (Program of 
Integral Strengthening). He takes pride in his organization’s careful navigation of cultural 
patrimony with the communities it works with. PFI’s current project is to build a forest 
along the mountain slope opposite of the Yungas. They have employed Aymaran 
communities to help test their hypothesis. This hypothetical forest would increase the 
amount of moisture in the area, as the trees would capture and contain the moisture that 
rolls into the plateau from the Yungas. Their consequent transpiration will release more 
water into the atmosphere, and thus it will rain more. His is not the type of work the 
government will step in to stop, as, should it succeed, it would only benefit the 
marginalized Bolivians living in the plateau. The PFI, much like the FAN, does not 
interfere with government projects. Both deal in environmental concerns, but they do so 
within the confines of an antagonistic state.  
While NGOs must tread carefully around this line, the Bolivian people have more 
freedom to express environmental concerns if their protest is composed of individuals or 
communities. If the MAS movement is truly one for all Bolivians, then all individual 
Bolivians can claim that nationalism. Historically, the state has listened to these 
movements and given concessions, as happened with the Eighth March from TIPNIS. 
Whether or not a mass movement against construction of the Chepete-Bala dam would 
entirely halt the government’s plans remains to be seen. 
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Contribution 
Utilizing prior research conducted on the environmental politics of the TIPNIS 
protest and under MAS governance in general, I hope to expound upon the narrative with 
my research done on the current resistance against the Chepete-Bala project. Since the 
TIPNIS conflict, the country has implemented new laws and has adapted to an ever-
changing global and national landscape. Through rhetoric surrounding the Chepete-Bala 
dam, I hope to show how the environment is still intractably involved in national politics. 
Thus far, no other articles examining the environmental politics surrounding the Chepete-
Bala dam have been published. This will be one of the first. 
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Chapter 3 
The Isiboro Secure Indigenous Territory and National Park (TIPNIS) 
Introduction 
In this section, I review literature on the conflict generated by the TIPNIS road. I 
provide a brief history of the park, followed by a discussion of government action and the 
indigenous resistance to the road. I highlight the types of environmentalism utilized by 
both the state and indigenous actors, specifically showing how the environment is used as 
a political positioning tool to gain leverage in the larger debate. 
The Isiboro Secure Indigenous Territory and National Park was created in 1965 as 
a Protected Area. Located in lowland Bolivia, just east of the La Paz department, it 
experienced massive migration in 1952 as part of colonization campaign to populate the 
lowlands started by the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR) (Mendizábal, 
2010). In response to the pressure from the subsequent deforestation, the three main 
indigenous tribes of the Beni, the Yuracaré, Mojeño, and T’simane, joined together in 
1990 for the first “march for justice and dignity,” and achieved legal recognition in 1996 
as an Original Community Territory (TCO). This effectively barred immigration to the 
region and designated parts of the territory as off limits to agriculture. Between then and 
2010, the group marched seven times. 
In 2011, these same communities participated in the Eighth March to protest the 
unwanted construction of the Villa Tunari–San Ignacio de Moxos Highway, which would 
cut through the middle of their territory causing great ecological harm. The march was 
met with violence by the state police in a small town called Chaparina, where 
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international media picked up on it (Fabricant & Postero, 2015). This incited national and 
international outrage, and gathered extensive social support for the marchers. Morales 
temporarily halted the project, but in 2013 he attempted a ‘postfacto consultation project,’ 
which again spurred protest. After a second march, the state dismissed the project for 
good. 
Controversy surrounded the project, and many speculated that Morales had 
motives ulterior to helping the region’s inhabitants. There were multiple and varying 
reasons that led people to question him, but perhaps the most pertinent was the outcry 
from the very people it deigned to help. The people he claimed the project would help are 
river peoples, travelling primarily by boat from community to community. Further, while 
the communities maintained that a road could have been useful, the majority lived well 
outside of the road’s immediate area (Hope, 2016). The road, once completed, would 
have “cut through the heart of the TIPNIS,” cutting across the area’s rivers which run 
from west to east into the Amazon (see Figure 2). Not only would this alter the course of 
the rivers for the entire region, likely having cascading ecological effects downstream, 
but it was also geographically distanced from the communities it claimed to help. 
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Figure 2: "Route of the Proposed Road through the TIPNIS." Source: (Liang 2015) 
 
There are varying reasons why the government could have chosen this placement 
for the road based. The first is his link to the cocaleros (coca growers), who had been 
vying for greater access to the park. This would not be so serious an allegation if the type 
of coca grown in this region were useful for public consumption. Instead, the 
predominant type of coca grown in this region is unsuitable for the domestic and cultural 
uses permitted by Bolivian law (Requena, 2016). Its only logical destination, then, would 
be the cocaine market. Another factor is that 25.5 percent of the TIPNIS had previously 
been granted to companies for hydrocarbon exploration, and Brazil’s involvement linked 
the road to region development via extraction (Hope, 2016). 
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While the purpose of this thesis is not to highlight the contradictions behind the 
government support of the TIPNIS highway, these same contradictions and the 
indigenous response to the project are inextricably tied to environmentalism. First, the 
project itself physically impacted the TIPNIS, generating concerns from 
environmentalists over its systemic effects. Additionally, if the hidden purpose of the 
project was indeed to push development via extraction of hydrocarbons, then the state is 
acting against its own environmental claims and laws. Second, identity politics from both 
sides attempted to justify the environment as rightfully theirs. The government positioned 
itself as the indigenous, caretaking authority of Mother Earth, meaning though their 
indigenous nationalism the project was implemented in favor of all indigenous Bolivians. 
The indigenous peoples of the TIPNIS utilized an environmentalism-from-below, place-
based environmentalism to combat the state’s claims and authority. 
 
Government Speech and Actions 
 Morales’s response to the public opposition and claims of corruption over the 
project was to claim interference by foreign NGOs. More specifically, he claimed that 
these NGOs had influenced the leaders of the opposition, essentially misguiding them to 
believe that the project would not benefit them. It was an attack on all Bolivian peoples, 
though the indigenous leaders were the ones who had been misled. The protests 
continued, leading President Morales to declare that, regardless of what the “alleged 
defenders of the environment” want, his government would build the road and complete 
it within the current term (La Rázon, 2011). Thus, the movement was publicly construed 
as an environmental one, though as Hope has shown it was not so simple as just 
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protecting the environment. She sees the conflict as one “where the form, rate and pace of 
development are being contested, in ways entangled with socioenvironmental concerns.” 
Her research reveals the dissonance between the government’s claim of an anti-neoliberal 
care for Pachamama and its drive for development and growth. Additionally, it speaks to 
the concept of indigeneity in Bolivia in light of how the constitutionally protected rights 
of the TIPNIS inhabitants were neglected in the government’s pursuit of the project. 
The MAS governance has acted against its respect for indigeneity on multiple 
occasions, both with the TIPNIS road and the Chepete-Bala Project. On both occasions, it 
sought to circumvent its legal obligation of consultation. With the TIPNIS road, it carried 
out selective consultation with project supporters to claim community support for the 
project. After using this small sample size to prove indigenous support for the project, it 
ignored independent ecological surveys that warned against the projects, instead 
administering its own and then refusing to release the results (Laing, 2015) (Requena, 
2016). The project was supported by cocaleros, madereros (loggers), and farmers, and 
the Morales criticized the lowland indigenous opposition, saying that he “could not 
understand why the indigenous siblings of the east, of the Amazon, and of the northern 
La Paz department oppose the development that all Bolivians need,” (No puedo entender 
que hermanos indígenas del oriente, de la Amazonía y del norte paceño se opongan al 
desarrollo que requiere el pueblo boliviano) later saying that even if Bolivia respects 
Mother Earth, it cannot stop “rational” and “exploitative” development of their natural 
resources (Mendizábal, 2010). 
Once the project had failed and the state had dismissed it, Vice President Alvaro 
García Linera wrote and published Geopolítica de la Amazonía (Geopolitics of the 
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Amazon), in which he defended the state’s actions of “progressive extractivism” as 
necessary not only for the development of the country, but also to help the lowland 
indigenous peoples who had been historically exploited by lowland elites, particularly 
ones in agribusiness (Fabricant & Postero, 2015). To break up this ingrained system of 
exploitation, the MAS governance must develop the region to allow the indigenous 
peoples greater sovereignty. Further, if the old relationship between elites and indigenous 
peoples no longer exists in the same way, the exploitative relationship still exists. Now, it 
exists between the indigenous peoples and NGOs. These NGOs have confused the 
lowland indigenous peoples with a discourse about “colonial environmentalists” to make 
them believe the government does not support their indigenous rights. Here, again, the 
government attempted to justify its extractivist actions as being pro-indigenous, which 
here meant liberating them from the big, agricultural, business elites that threated their 
lands as well as the NGOs that addled their minds.   
 
Anti-road Response 
According to Hope, the TIPNIS conflict was steeped in socio-environmental 
concerns. She described the protest as being a type of environmentalism she called 
“environmentalism-from-below.” Further dissection of the protest reveals how nature is 
valued in these societies, which frames the environmental discourse utilized by the 
protesters (Hope, 2016). The Eighth March and its continued protest was not a direct 
rejection of the road, the MAS movement, or economic development. Rather, it was a 
protest for the right to negotiation and discourse. They wanted their voices to carry the 
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political power designated to them by the Constitution and wanted a voice in the 
economic development plans that involved their home.  
To achieve this end, the movement utilized multiple strategies, but perhaps their 
most well-received was the mobilization of their indigeneity. Specifically, under the 
Bolivian Constitution, the indigenous peoples have ownership of their ancestral lands and 
a right to prior consultation over any development projects planned for their lands. The 
territorial rights they claimed were based on their victorious first march in 1990 that 
succeeded in getting them legal recognition of “proven historical attachment” to the area. 
This claim was a key point in their campaign against the state’s actions: that the state had 
ignored their “indigenous” rights. 
Much of the motivation for the marchers was focused on this governmental over-
step because, as many of Hope’s interviewees said, the TIPNIS was home. This was 
where they had raised their families and lived for generations. They were tied to the land, 
dependent upon its plants, animals, and rivers. She called this a “place-based 
environmentalism,” one that stems from reliance upon the land’s natural resources that 
foments this cultural appreciation and value. It was not that the protesters were against 
development of the region, but they felt the road was not an appropriate development 
plan as it did not support their particular needs and values. Instead, they expressed 
concerns over things such as lack of access to immediate healthcare, which the road at its 
planned location would not provide them. They proposed a simple solution: build the 
road so that it wrapped around their territory. Otherwise, it would not pass by any of their 
communities, and none of the proposed benefactors would ever use it. It would cut 
through the “heart of the TIPNIS” uselessly. 
37	
	
Analysis 
The TIPNIS conflict shows how indigeneity in Bolivia has become increasingly 
wrapped up in “environmentalism-from-below” responses to government actions. As 
argued by Laing, it has become a game of identity politics. Indigenous identity has been 
re-fashioned to have an essentialized inclusion of connection to the environment ‘in order 
to legitimize competing resource sovereignty claims’ (Laing, 2015). She found that the 
government had “reified an essentialized Aymaran identity” through adoption of vivir 
bien, recognition of the rights of Pachamama and discourse that “capitalism is 
incompatible with environmental sustainability” to legitimize claim and craft a type of 
state resource nationalism. This Aymaran cast, however, hinders the government’s ability 
to truly represent all indigenous peoples of Bolivia. By wearing coca wreaths and 
following highland, Aymaran traditions and cultures, the Morales government necessarily 
marginalizes the lowland indigeneities who do not share the same customs. Its claim to 
be Pachamama’s protector, then, becomes a suspect for investigation. Pachamama is the 
Andean construct of Mother Earth – lowland indigenous cultures tend to use Madre 
Tierra (also Mother Earth). If the state’s claim to protect Pachamama sought to 
rhetorically legitimize the state’s use of natural resources as nationally oriented and 
ecologically sensitive, then what of those that revere Madre Tierra, not Pachamama? 
 This is one such way the TIPNIS marchers differentiated themselves from the 
state’s indigenous nationalism: frequent reference to Madre Tierra and not to 
Pachamama. During the TIPNIS marches, the CIDOB positioned themselves as people 
inherently linked to and dependent upon their land in the TIPNIS. Any loss of natural 
resources or biodiversity was a loss of culture and livelihood for the tribes of the TIPNIS. 
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Additionally, they invoked the name of Evo Morales as “the main defender of the rights 
of indigenous peoples and of the Madre Tierra” while declaring a state of emergency 
based on their rights, the constitutional clauses of territorial determination and integrity, 
and the rights of Madre Tierra. This shows how the lowland identity was re-constructed 
to “resist and undermine dominant knowledges” around the state’s resource extraction 
claims (Laing, 2015).  
In additional to national-level identity politics, The TIPNIS communities’ 
political claims transcended local politics by invoking global language and context. By 
framing the road in the context of climate change, they elevated the issue to one of 
planetary importance. During Laing’s time participating in the Ninth March, she found 
that the TIPNIS would frequently be referred to as the ‘pulmón del mundo’ (lungs of the 
world) and ‘corazón de agua dulce’ (heart of fresh water) of Bolivia and/or Latin 
America. The TIPNIS road was also literally considered a global issue during the 
Extraordinary Meeting of Community Leaders of the TIPNIS No. 29 when the health of 
the area was linked to ‘global warming.’ The invocation of this global language and 
context served to counter the government’s “rhetorical tools” and use of Pachamama and 
vivir bien. By placing the TIPNIS highway in the global context of climate change, they 
turned it into an environmental issue. 
In conclusion, the TIPNIS conflict revealed how the environment is tied to themes 
of development, indigeneity, and politics in Bolivia. Now, six years later, the government 
has attempted another project, utilizing many of the same rhetorical strategies as it did 
with the TIPNIS highway. Building upon the research over the environmentalisms of the 
TIPNIS conflict, in the next chapter I will show how the actions surrounding the 
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Chepete-Bala dam have many of the same characteristics as the TIPNIS ones. In 
particular, the environmentalisms utilized by both sides are essentially the same as the 
ones from the TIPNIS conflict. 
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Chapter 4 
The Chepete-Bala Dam 
Introduction 
The Beni River begins in the Andes between La Paz and Cochabamba, flowing 
northward into the Amazon Basin through Madidi National Park and Natural Area of 
Integrated Management and through the Pilon Lajas Biosphere and OCT. Madidi 
National Park is globally renowned as one of the most biodiverse places in the world, and 
it’s existence reached global audiences as National Geographic featured stories from the 
park as their cover story in its March 2000 issue (Sartore, 2016). Rurrenabaque is a port 
town and launching point into the Madidi National Park, and is located on the Beni river 
north of San Miguel del Bala, along the northern edge of the park. It is the hub for 
ecotourism in the region, with Lonely Planet describing it as “civilization’s last stand” 
with restaurants, cafes, and hotels that “cater mainly to Western tastes” (Lonely Planet, 
2017). 
In November of 2016, the Morales government began pushing forward another 
development project. Two narrow stretches of the Beni River, the Chepete and San 
Miguel del Bala, had been considered since 1958 as ideal sites for a system of two 
hydroelectric dams. The first dam would be built at the Chepete, and the Bala would be 
built second some ten years. Together, the government says they would generate some 
3.676 megavolts of electricity, which it plans to sell to Brazil. It claims the project would 
affecting less than 2% of the protected area (Layme, Morales: Debemos hacer más 
represas para que no falte agua, 2016).  
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Despite the government’s claim that the project is necessary for Bolivian 
development and that the projects area of impact is small, it has raised serious economic 
and political concerns in the country. “There is no way to defend this project,” said 
Cecilia Requena as she detailed the project’s economic and ecological absurdity. The first 
dam (the Chepete stretch) would cost between 6,900,000,000 and 6,300,000,000 USD 
based on independent assessments (Salón, 2016) (Solís, 2017). Bolivia’s GDP is roughly 
33 billion USD, meaning this project is extremely expensive for Bolivia to undertake 
(World Bank, 2015). This estimate does not include the 1000 kilometers of line necessary 
to bring the energy to Brazil for sale in Cuyaba (Salón, 2016). In addition to being 
financially unrealistic, the government has refused to release its preliminary ecological 
surveys to the public. Even further, they conducted the final studies and plans without 
advising the local indigenous populations of their actions, which is mandated by the 2009 
Constitution. 
While the economic and political concerns are used to condemn the project, its 
ecological and geographic impacts have served as the impetus for resistance. Building the 
dam in its planned place would lead to cascading ecological consequences downstream. 
The Beni River runs through one of the most biodiverse areas of the planet, flowing into 
the Amazon from the Andes, carrying minerals and nutrients from the highlands down 
into the lowlands. Cutting this source off would mean less of the mountain’s nutrients for 
the natural systems downstream, and it would impact the indigenous and traditional 
farmers that rely on the basins floodwaters to bring nutrients to the soil (Requena, 2016). 
More immediate than the downstream aftermath, the newly flooded area would kill a lot 
of vegetation, whose decomposition would release an alarming amount of Methane gas 
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into the environment, contributing to global climate change. It would also inundate four 
indigenous territories dam creates its lake, and displace almost four thousand people 
(Solís, 2017). While the government maintains that the flooding would not harm the 
populations themselves, it still completely changes the historical and cultural landscape 
of the tribes. Traditional hunting grounds will be submerged, and places of cultural or 
spiritual significance could be lost in the rising waters. Figure 3 shows the projected 
flooding of the area. 
Unsurprisingly, the indigenous peoples that would be affected by it have rejected 
it for various reasons: lack of government transparency, lack of government consultation, 
and because, ultimately, this area is their home. They mounted a resistance to the project, 
Figure	3:	Projected	flooding	of	the	Chepete	and	the	Bala	Dams.	Source:	(Salón,	2016) 
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completing a 12-day vigil near the site where the Bala construction would begin, holding 
signs that cite Article 30 of Bolivia’s constitution. During this time, the government 
attempted to explain the indigenous resistance as misguided, and Morales spoke various 
times to the importance of the project. At the time of this project, the resistance had not 
succeeded in completely halting the project, although the 12-day vigil had succeeded in 
forcing Servicoms, a geotechnical survey company, to remove its equipment from both 
sites.  
The conflict surrounding the Chepete-Bala project is steeped in environmental 
politics. Much like in the TIPNIS conflict, the affected communities utilize place-based 
environmentalism to try and convince the government to drop the project. Further, they 
invoke their indigeneity to justify their resistance to the project, which they claim is not 
worth the destruction it will bring to the protected areas on either side of the river. The 
government, much like in the TIPNIS conflict, has attempted to explain the resistance as 
problem of “socialization,” claiming that the indigenous peoples are only resisting 
because they have been confused by of “small groups” (Véliz, 2016). This chapter will 
elaborate on these themes, and show how the environmentalism is key to understanding 
the conflict. 
 
Government Speech & Actions 
Morales has claims that the protestors of the project have been indoctrinated by 
“small groups” (Pinto, 2016) that opposed the construction based on personal interest and 
fear of plausible environmental disaster (Véliz, 2016). The government further specified, 
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accusing four NGOs of creating the resistance based on personal interests. Principally, 
the Minster of Autonomies, Hugo Siles, accused Fundación Solón, but more specifically 
Pablo Solón, of pushing his personal interests. He deepened the accusation, saying that 
Solón was also responding to foreign interests. This narrative serves as a delegitimization 
tactic against those indigenous people that oppose the project by removing their 
autonomy, claiming they are the unwitting actors of “small groups.”  
Much like with the TIPNIS conflict, the government is competing with the 
indigenous peoples of the Madidi area for resource claims. To do so, they must prove that 
their interests and their representation of all Bolivians carry more weight than the 
relatively small number of protesters that do have a constitutionally legitimate claim on 
the area. Some days after the initial controversy surrounding the dam, Morales attempted 
a new claim: that Bolivia should create more dams so it would not lack water (Layme, 
Morales: Debemos hacer más represas para que no falte agua, 2016). Despite the dearth 
of ecological knowledge present in this statement, Morales generated this argument at a 
time of severe drought. He tied the dam to a national environmental crisis: water scarcity. 
By elevating the issue to a national scale, he attempted to usurp the indigenous resistance 
by belittling its claims to the region. If the government can claim to represent all Bolivian 
indigeneities, then it can theoretically justify making these “greater good” decisions. 
 
Anti-dam Response 
The indigenous peoples of the Madidi and Pilón Lajas reserves were 
understandably upset by the govenrment’s actions. Not only had the government ignored 
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their right to prior consultation on the project, but it then claimed their resistance wasn’t 
in fact theirs but that it belonged to “small groups.” They rejected these claims, saying 
that “In saying that we let ourselves be misled, you are depreciating the intelligence and 
rational capacity that we have not only as indigenous peoples of the tierras bajas, but 
also as indigenous peoples of Bolivia” (Al decir que nos dejamos engañar usted esta 
menospreciando la inteligencia y capacidad de razonamiento que temenos no solo los 
indígenas de tierras bajas sino todos los indígenas de Bolivia) (Véliz, 2016). Here, the 
protestors utilize their indigeneity to position themselves as mistreated by the pro-
indigenous government. They elevate Morales’s belittlement to a national level, claiming 
that an attack on their intellectual capacity is simultaneously belittling all Bolivian 
indigenous peoples. After this, they decided they no longer wanted prior consultation, as 
it was too late, and instead elevated the matter more broadly to be one about respect for 
indigenous rights and respect for the constitution (ANF, 2016). 
In a similar fashion to the TIPNIS conflict, the protesters utilized a place-based 
environmentalism to justify their resistance to the dam. “We have not forgotten that we 
have lived forever in these lands that you now want to destroy” (“No olvidemos que 
nosotros vivimos desde siempre en estas tierras que ahora usted quiere destruir”) (Véliz, 
2016). Morales is not just destroying the earth, but he is consciously destroying the land 
where they have always lived. This again elevates the government’s actions as 
disrespecting indigenous rights. 
While the true resistance lies with the indigenous population of the Madidi and 
Pilón Lajas protected areas, the knowledge of the economic and ecological impact was 
indeed bolstered by environmentally conscious groups. Fundación Solón in particular 
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was referenced in many news articles as one of the organizations that frequent spoke on 
“the irreversible harm to the environment” that the government would commit. It shared 
independent investigations and statistics of the Chepete-Bala project, which often 
contradicted the government’s purported data. It created its own videos and slide 
presentations to educate the public on why the project is infeasible and ecologically 
abhorrent to those concerned about its effect on the natural world. For this reason, the 
government singled the NGO out and threated to kick it from the country, claiming that it 
was “manipulating the indigenous peoples into organizing against the Chepete-Bala 
project” (El País, 2016).   
 
Coordinadora Para la Defensa de la Amazonía 
One of the main organizers of the indigenous resistance was the Coordinadora 
para la Defensa de la Amazonía (Coordinator for the Defense of the Amazon, CODA). 
The CODA is a grassroots response from the Rurrenabaque community to the Chepete-
Bala dam project. Utilizing grassroots methods, it helped to organize the 12-day vigil 
held in opposition to the dam. It created a Facebook page through which it spread news 
and events to its followers. Additionally, it used Facebook as a platform for sharing its 
conducted interviews with the indigenous inhabitants of the San Miguel del Bala 
community. Its YouTube channel has a total of 26 videos, including a series of 20 
interviews in which a single community member details why they oppose the Chepete-
Bala dam, a video from the 10th day of the vigil, and a video from the victory march held 
after Servicons removed their equipment from the site. 
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While the interviews the CODA conducted and posted were likely the ones that 
most supported their claims, the videos serve to give face to the resistance. These 
community members were portrayed not as indigenous peoples toting tribal artifacts and 
garments, but as relatable to all Bolivians (Coordinadora Para la Defensa de la Amazonia, 
2017). Often, they were portrayed in their working environments. A horse nibbled Yamil 
Nay Vargas’s sleeve as he spoke, and two men were interviewed as they laid concrete 
and tile on their front porches. Children were seen laughing and moving in the 
background, and one child breastfed as Encarnación Mejía spoke. Most interviews began 
with the interviewee giving their name and detailing the size of their family. Then, with 
some variant of “I say no to the Chepete-Bala dam because” they began to list why they 
opposed the project. Most of the interviewees did not want to leave the land they had 
lived on since birth, and many women questioned where they would go once displaced. 
Some highlighted their dependence and coexistence with the land, expressing concern 
that once it floods it will no longer be able to provide the same resources. A few 
highlighted that tourism was a primary income for the community, and destroying the 
environment with the dam would stop people from coming. Some placed the 
displacement of animals and plants on the same level as human displacement. In all, none 
understood why the government ignored them, and they hoped that these videos would 
reach all Bolivians to help them stop the project. 
In these interviews, the environment is an essentialized part of “home.” They 
utilize this place-based environmentalism to justify their opposition to the project. 
Altering the river, flooding the land, and destroying the environment is also the 
destruction of their homes. It then becomes an economic question as well. They survive 
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not only on the tourism that comes because of the environment, but also on the primary 
resources provided by the environment. This positions them as both living with and by 
their environment, and any action against the environment therefore becomes an attack 
on their very way of life. By combining the issues of environmental destruction with 
destruction of home and culture, they show that the Chepete-Bala conflict is ultimately an 
attack on their indigenous rights. 
The CODA posted a titled “Aclaracion y Publica” to their Facebook page. It seeks 
to clarify what the CODA is, what it is not, and what it supports. Careful analysis of this 
document reveals the politicized reality of environmentalism that ecologically conscious 
actors face in Bolivia. Thus, with due significance, the first point is that it is not an NGO. 
Its sixth point claims they do not receive economic support from any national or 
international NGO. It is supported by the money and volunteerism of the Rurrenabaque 
people that “respect life and love their earth” (Coordinadora Para La Defensa De La 
Amazonia, 2016).  Their second point claims they do not misinform the public, and that 
in fact they have support from “practically the whole country.” The clarification that it is 
not an NGO certainly stems from the government’s frequent clashes with what it sees to 
be self- or foreign-interested organizations that disseminate anti-MAS, false information. 
Being an NGO would invalidate the CODA from having any political clout or voice. 
Further, their descriptions of its constituency and support must also be mentioned. By 
claiming that its support comes from a people that “respect life and love their earth,” it 
claims that it stands for life and the Madre Tierra, meaning the Chepete-Bala project does 
not and by extension, the MAS and Evo Morales do not. To expand impact of the claim, 
it notes people from most of the country supports their efforts, this time demonstrating 
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that their organization is one of Bolivia. For their efforts to be supported by “practically 
the whole country,” it competes with the MAS’s claim to represent all Bolivians. 
Points three through five were an apparently necessary clarification: the CODA 
has never received economic support from Fundación Solón. Further, it clarifies that the 
only information Fundación Solón provides the Bolivian population is informative and 
appropriately cited. While this information is shared on the CODA’s social media outlets, 
the CODA does not only use Fundación Solón’s work. The document clarifies in point 
five that they refer to many experts and professionals of various academic backgrounds, 
both national and international. To further establish its impartiality, point seven states 
their lack of political or personal interests and carefully indicates that it is not an 
opposition party to the MAS.  
All of these clarifications are to avoid possible government criticism and 
consequent delegitimization. An association with Fundación Solón would place them 
amongst NGO environmentalist groups, meaning they would lose credibility as an 
indigenous, community grassroots organization. This credibility is a necessary 
component for the validity of their claims against the project, as being legitimately 
indigenous and Bolivian are two of its mostly valid claims in the eyes of the government. 
Yet, the CODA recognizes that Fundación Solón’s work and data are valuable for their 
cause, and so still employ it. To help justify its use, they label its work as “for the 
Bolivian population in general” and as “informative and documented with corresponding 
sources.” First, by claiming that it is for all Bolivians, it competes with the government’s 
claim that Fundación Solón is an NGO that purports an individual’s agenda – not a 
Bolivian one. Then, stating that it cites appropriate sources makes it technically credible, 
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which the government cannot refute if it is operating on objective fact. Points five and 
seven on professional references and political alignment are an attempt at transparency 
and conflict avoidance. By recognizing that they indeed receive foreign counsel removed 
the possibility that the government could uncover foreign influence in their affairs, and 
by explicitly stating they are not an opposition, they make it much harder for the 
government to claim that they are. 
Points ten through twelve utilize even more of the staple rhetorical strategies. It 
clarifies that the organization is for the country’s development, but that it believes it 
should be strengthened “responsibly.” This means investing in the areas of eco-tourism, 
clean energy, and generally the sustainable development of their region and that of the 
entire country. Their next point evokes the name of the Madre Tierra as it claims the 
group seeks to live with mutual respect with her. The placement of this point after a call 
for sustainable development seems significant, as if anything other than “responsible” 
development is necessarily against Mother Earth. To finish the logical trail, the twelfth 
point clarifies the organization’s effort to respect indigenous communities, Nature, and 
the established laws and norms. The CODA is following the Bolivian ideals and 
constitutional laws, and by stating that they do, it creates a duality in which the 
government is not. 
The document ends with a call for professionals working on the project to be 
ethical and to recognize that the project will “attack” the most biodiverse place in world. 
This would affect entire families, ignore the Constitution they operate by, and completely 
alter the economic “vocation” of the affected muncipialities with floods and droughts. 
This, they argue, should be considered an attack on the right to life. Thus, the CODA 
51	
	
appeals to the humanity and ethics of the involved professionals, that this “noble fight” 
should “take up the flag of respect for life.” By finishing with a direct address to the 
professionals working on the project, the CODA positions itself as an alternative 
authority to the state. The professionals could choose to either obey the state and continue 
with the project, or they could “respect life” and ethically side with the CODA and 
affected communities. 
 
Analysis 
The Chepete-Bala conflict necessarily involves the environment as it will alter the 
geography of the landscape, but the environment itself is utilized in multiple types of 
environmentalism expressed by both the state and resistance. Many of the tactics 
employed were the same as those used during the TIPNIS conflict. The state attempted 
combat the inhabitants claims to the land by discrediting their claims as misled by “small 
groups” that worried about what environmental destruction could happen. Here they 
invoked the same indigenous nationalism as with the TIPNIS road, attempting to create a 
with-us or against-us dichotomy. This generalization attempted to undercut the valid 
environmental and political claims made by the affected peoples. 
The resistance utilized multiple environmentalisms to legitimize their claims 
against the state. Because the state delegitimizes environmentalism for the environment’s 
sake by construing it as either misled or selfish, they used their unique relationship with 
the region to claim a place-based environmentalism. This environment was part of their 
way of life, so destroying it would in tandem destroy them, or at least say their culture is 
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unimportant. The state cannot do this, as it is bound by its constitution and rhetoric of 
indigenous nationalism to respect indigenous ways of life. The resistance visually used 
this claim with their posters telling the state to respect Article 30 of the Constitution. 
Thus, the politics of this conflict cannot be understood without careful analysis of the 
actors’ relationships to nature.  
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Chapter 5 
Conclusion 
Bolivia is a developing state, and the majority of its national income comes from 
sales of hydrocarbons and monoculture crops. Its extraction-based development model 
does not mean it is insensitive to the possible ecological harm caused by extraction, but 
as Juan Carlos Pinto of the Vicepresidency’s office said, the government has mouths to 
feed. Can they afford to be so environmentally-minded when their people need food? 
Thus, faced with the economic realities of a developing country, the government’s 
perspective on environmentalism used to counter state claims is largely negative. Despite 
this, the government has espoused vivir bien as its form of state-sponsored indigenous 
nationalism, and in this construct of indigeneity is an essentialized link to the 
environment. The government, by touting this indigenous nationalism, crafted a dual 
claim: that it possessed the right to extract natural resources from the environment while 
simultaneously being an international voice for indigenous environmentalism. Any 
opposition to the state from Bolivian citizens, then, could be cast off as confused, misled, 
or self-interested. 
This claim marginalized any indigenous or environmental resistance to the 
government’s developmental projects in the TIPNIS and on the Beni River. The affected 
communities of both projects had to compete with the state for territory claims, which 
meant finding ways to make their claims to the environment more legitimate than the 
state’s. To get the full narrative of indigenous identity politics in Bolivia, then, one must 
understand the actors’ relationships with nature. In the same way that the TIPNIS conflict 
underscored how the interplay of identity politics in legitimizing resource claims, the 
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Chepete-Bala dam is mired in the same discussions, framed by the same conflict of 
interests. Much of the state’s current rhetoric about the Chepete-Bala project mirrors that 
used during the TIPNIS events, so much so that it could be considered as an extension of 
the original environmental, political positioning discourse seen during the TIPNIS 
conflict. In both cases, the government tried to delegitimize the lowland indigenous claim 
of territorial sovereignty by claiming it was a foreign one or misled by non-indigenous 
actors. By both claiming foreign subterfuge and by claiming it represented all indigenous 
peoples of Bolivia, the state positioned the projects and resistance to the project as 
nationalist endeavors. Necessarily, this also separated the lowland indigenous identity of 
the protestors from the indigenous nationalism purported government. Despite this 
rhetorical strategy, the TIPNIS Eighth March was successful in stopping construction, 
and the 12-day vigil held in resistance to the Chepete-Bala dam forced the surveying 
company off the banks. 
Through the two cases of the TIPNIS conflict and the Chepete-Bala dam, this 
study has shown various ways in which the environment is used in Bolivian politics. 
Particularly important is the environment’s significance for identity politics. For the 
TIPNIS conflict, Laing found that lowland indigenous identity can be contemporarily 
understood as a counter to the state’s claim on their natural resources. The marchers 
sought to counter state resource sovereignty claims by reifying its identity around 
“notions of ecological sustainability” (Laing, 2015). This is not to say that lowland 
identity is simply a counter movement, but simply an assertion that their purported 
identity and narrative cannot be completely understood without sensitivity to the political 
climate. My contribution to the field is the discovery that the Chepete-Bala resistance 
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utilized many of the same tactics, employing place-based environmentalism in their from-
below resistance. Given the contemporary nature of this conflict, prior research has not 
been conducted, making this study one of the first. 
Ideally, I could have spent time with the communities that will be affected by the 
Chepete-Bala project to interview them and better learn their perspectives on the projects. 
As it is, I was limited to representations of them via interviews with informants, news 
articles, and Facebook. Additionally, my number of interviews with informants was 
regrettably small. More would have given me better data with which to comment on both 
the Chepete-Bala and TIPNIS conflicts.  
For further research, I recommend examining how the state is handling the current 
water scarcity crisis. Both the Chepete-Bala and TIPNIS conflicts were localized 
projects, meaning there were clear aggressors and objectives. With water scarcity, 
however, there is no resistance to point a finger out, so how will the state react? This 
research would be pertinent not only because water politics are increasingly important on 
the global scale, but also because understanding any nuances of these politics will better 
inform policy-making for water scarce countries. This would complement my study, and 
add important new chapters to Bolivia’s socioenvironmental narrative. 
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